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This paper deals with the evaluation of poverty sensitivity to growth and
distributional changes in Italy, across its regions and over a three-decade pe-
riod, spanning from 1977 to 2004. We use the “Survey on Household Income
and Wealth” (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy to firstly construct growth inci-
dence curves. After estimating the size income distribution, we evaluate the
income and the inequality elasticities of poverty. Growth strongly determines
the patterns of poverty; however, inequality appears to have strikingly char-
acterized it as well. The difference between North, Centre and South can be
due to the different income elasticity of poverty, which in turn depends on
the initial conditions of inequality and level of development.
JEL: C14, C23, C46, I3, O52
1 Introduction
Along with the intensification of the research involved in understanding the microeco-
nomic causes of poverty movements, macroeconomic aspects of poverty changes have
stimulated a renewed interest. How are the gains of growth distributed to the poor?
What are the effects of growth on poverty? Yet, what are the effects of distributional
changes on poverty trends? These questions appear always more relevant in establishing
poverty-reduction strategies.
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It is largely recognized that economic growth is necessary to achieve poverty reduction;
its impact on the poor depends, however, on how its benefits are distributed across the
population. The more recent distributional dynamics have stimulated strong disputes
on the effectiveness of policies growth-oriented only; inequality issues have entered into
the growth-poverty nexus, because of both their direct and indirect effect - through
the growth channel - on poverty. Given a mean income, lower inequality reduces static
poverty; to the extent that economic growth is affected by inequality, or vice versa,
poverty responsiveness depends also on inequality due to this latter link. Several other
factors seem strikingly relevant in determining the extent to which growth can affect
poverty; the level of development and the initial level of inequality are good candidates
to explain the different outcomes of the growth process in terms of poverty reduction.
There is a broad agreement in the literature that the more egalitarian the distribution of
income the more powerfully income growth reduces poverty, and that the positive effect
of lower inequality on poverty reduction is higher in richer countries.
Although most of the attention on these issues has been paid with reference to the
developing world, several aspects of the recent trends in the advanced countries, in terms
of low economic performance and increasing inequality, stimulate this paper on analyzing
the impact of growth and inequality on poverty trends in Italy. The huge recession of
the 90’s, the recent distributional changes, describing Italy as one of the most unequal
of the advanced countries [14], the strong dualistic structure of its economy resulting in
high differentials in standards of living between northern, central and southern regions
motivate the attention of this work on whether growth and inequality have influenced
the poverty movements across the Italian regions and if so, to which extent.
Towards this end we use the “Survey on Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW) of
the Bank of Italy drawn between the 1977 and the 2004 across the 20 Italian regions
to evaluate the extent by which growth has contributed to poverty reduction and the
degree by which poverty has responded to inequality changes as well. The analysis is
based on semi-parametric and parametric approaches. Growth incidence curves [17] are
firstly constructed to evaluate how the gains of growth have been distributed over time
and across the Italian regions. After estimating the size of the income distribution to
assess whether incomes were lognormal distributed, income and inequality elasticities
of poverty are estimated. The study is conducted both over the long run (1977-2004)
and splitting the sample in two sub-periods to evaluate how poverty has responded
to growth and inequality in periods in which the country exhibited different economic
performances; the first, since 1977 to 1991, characterized by a huge decrease in poverty
rates, and the second - between the 1991 and the 2004 - during which the striking slump
at the beginning of the 90’s had conditioned and modified the poverty trends.
Following this section, the second section sketches the theoretical links between growth
and inequality and their nexus with poverty. The third section specifies the data used and
the methodology employed to derive the basic data on poverty and inequality from the
surveys; the section follows illustrating the main trends in poverty, inequality and growth.
Section four discusses the methodology used to compute the growth incidence curves and
to develop the parametric estimations of the income and inequality elasticities. After
the description of the results in section five, the last section concludes.
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2 “Bringing poverty in from the cold”: pro-poor growth and
arithmetic identities
As Besley and Burgess [10] point out, the relationship between economic growth and
poverty is ultimately a matter of quantification.
Several authors [19, 29] started looking at changes in poverty rates as decomposable
in two separate and distinct effects: growth and inequality effects. Based on accounting
techniques, the identity link between poverty, mean income and distribution is disen-
tangled decomposing the rate of change of a poverty measure between two periods in
growth and inequality components. The former component is obtained by measuring
the poverty change due to observed growth, leaving the income distribution unchanged.
The latter matches the poverty change due to the empirical inequality changes, while
leaving mean income unchanged. Datt and Ravallion [19] analyze not only these direct
and separate effects, but also whether their interaction may affect poverty reduction,
allowing for a residual term. This latter term is due to the path-dependence of this
decomposition; when applied with different reference years this methodology could fur-
nish different results for the two effects. As the two authors suggest, the residual term,
capturing this bias, can be interpreted as an interaction between the two components.
In other cases, it has been eliminated, offering an exact decomposition [29]. This kind
of approach suffers, however, from several drawbacks. The more relevant of them seems
to be related to their likely path dependence. They ignore that the effects on poverty
reduction are due to the interplay of growth and inequality, and not simply to their
arithmetic sum; what matters is not only the extent of those effects, but also their shape
and timing [12]. Further, this methodology is very sensitive to the inequality measure
used. While the results may be useful for the evaluation of past dynamics, they may be
quite useless for drawing conclusions on general causality effects. Finally, and related
to this, this procedure may be quite uninformative on the relative extents of the growth
and inequality effects on poverty reduction; if - let’s say - the growth effect is larger than
the inequality effect, it may be due either to a higher poverty sensitivity to growth or
to small distributional changes with respect to the observed growth.
Recognizing these likely pitfalls, the literature is focusing on measuring this relation
through parametric and semi-parametric estimation of poverty elasticities to growth and
inequality. This empirical strategy basically stems from and is connected to the diffusion
of the idea of “pro-poor” growth. Growth is defined as pro-poor if it results in higher
growth rates for the poor than the non-poor; broadly, growth should be biased toward
the poor regardless of its impact on the reduction of poverty levels. Even though the
notion of pro-poor growth is still much debated [17, 31, 33, 41, 46], much effort has
been put in trying to narrow it into broadly different definitions, such as absolute versus
relative definitions or yet weak versus strong ones. Growth is defined as weakly pro-
poor if it reduces poverty, regardless of its extent and its degree. A growth process
is, hence, called pro-poor, even though the poor would receive a small fraction of the
total benefits; a sufficient condition for applying this definition is that the growth rate
in income among the poor is greater than zero. A deeper approach defines a process
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as pro-poor, depending on whether this had either a relative or an absolute impact.
The relative notion characterizes growth as pro-poor if the growth rate of income of
the poor exceeds the average income growth rate; growth needs to be relatively biased
toward the poor, with the latter having an income growth exceeding the average. This
relative view stems from the fact that growth, on top of reducing poverty, does imply a
reduction in relative inequality. Growth is defined as absolute pro-poor if the absolute
amount of the income gain of the poor exceeds, or is equal to, that of non poor. This view
implies falling absolute inequality as consequence of economic growth episodes. Different
approaches have been proposed to measure the degree of pro-poorness of growth and to
assess whether poverty responds to growth and distributional changes and if so, to which
extent; among them, the computation of the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth
and inequality has gained high relevance in the literature, as it is a useful aggregate
index that summarizes the growth-poverty relationship.
Estimates of this elasticity have been obtained in several ways. Ravallion [40, 41] have
proposed to relate poverty changes to a distribution-corrected rate of growth, where the
ordinary growth rate is corrected and weighed for an inequality factor, inferring it by a
relation such as
POV = α[1− INEQ] ∗ g (1)
where the rate of poverty reduction (POV ) is directly related to the ordinary growth
rate, g, times a correction factor, which is a function of a measure of initial inequality
(INEQ). Ravallion [42] extends this idea to take into account the likely presence of
non-linearity1 in the interplay between growth and inequality, by exploring a relation
like
POV = α[1− INEQ]θ ∗ g (2)
This issue is parametrically developed by exploiting the properties of specific and well-
known distributions. Given some measures of inequality and per capita income, growth
and inequality elasticities of poverty can be properly estimated, once the empirical dis-
tribution of income can be described by some known distribution and if this latter may
fit well the former. Much attention has been paid to the characteristics of the lognormal
distribution to fit the income distribution [3, 12, 25, 32, 36, 39, 45] for its tractability
and its satisfactory fit of the lower tails
“The two functions most often used are the Pareto and the lognormal. The
Pareto function fits the data fairly well towards the higher levels but the fit
is poor towards the lower income levels. The lognormal fits the lower income
levels better but its fit towards the upper end is far from satisfactory.” [45]
1On the empirical correlation between growth and inequality many pieces of research have been fur-
nished. An excellent survey of the issue is in Banerjee and Duflo [8]. Much of the effort of the
literature has been focused in trying to assess whether or not this relationship can fit the Kuznets
inverted-U hypothesis. It appears that omitted country or areas specific characteristics invalidate
most of the studies confirming the inverted-U hypothesis [15, 23].
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Following this approach, poverty reduction at a given point of time is fully determined
by the rate of growth of the mean income of the population and the change in the income
distribution. Formally, the proportion of the population at time t with an income below
the poverty line z (i.e. the headcount is used as poverty measure) is equal to the
probability that income Yt is lower than the poverty line:
Ht = Pr(Yt < z) ≡ Ft(z) (3)
where Ft(z) is the income distribution function.
In the spirit of previous studies [12, 25, 32, 36] and using the results obtained by
Aitchison and Brown [3], if incomes follow a lognormal distribution the above poverty
measure may be expressed by:
Ht = Φ
(
log (z/µt)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
(4)
where Φ (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and σt stands for the standard deviation of the logarithm of income. Under the lognor-
mality assumption a one-to-one mapping between the Gini index and the Lorenz curve,
and then the standard deviation, does exist. Hence, let be Gt the Gini coefficient at
time t - our measure of inequality; it is easily verified that
Gt = 2Φ
(
σt√
2
)
− 1 (5)
For sufficiently small changes, the first-order approximation results in:
dHt
dt
=
∂Ht
∂µt
dµt
dt
+
∂Ht
∂Gt
dGt
dt
(6)
that in terms of elasticity can be expressed by:
dHt
dt
= η
dµt
dt
Ht
µt
+ γ
dGt
dt
Ht
Gt
(7)
where η and γ are respectively the income and inequality elasticities of poverty and
represent the direct effects of growth and inequality on poverty reduction.
Other indirect effects may influence poverty movements over time. The role of the
initial inequality and the level of development, for which the ratio of poverty line over
mean income is used as proxy [32], seem good candidates to indirectly explain why
poverty does differently respond to income and inequality changes, across regions and
over time. Formally, from (4) it is possible to derive the income elasticity of poverty as
follow:
η =
∂Ht
∂µt
µt
Ht
≡ − 1
σt
φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
)
Φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
) ≤ 0 (8)
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where φ and Φ are, respectively, the probability and cumulative distribution functions
of the standard normal distribution.
The income elasticity is negative and decreasing, in absolute terms, in the ratio of
poverty line over mean income (z/µt) and the standard deviation of log-income (σt).
Similarly, it is possible to derive the inequality effect; as shown above, the Gini is
a positively correlated function of the standard deviation. If the standard deviation is
used as inequality index, the inequality elasticity of poverty is given by:
γσ =
∂Ht
∂σt
σt
Ht
≡
φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
)
Φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
) (− log (z/µt)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
≥ 0 (9)
Using the Gini coefficient as inequality measure, the poverty elasticity is derived from
(9) and (5) as
γG = γσ
∂σt
∂Gt
Gt
σt
(10)
The inequality elasticity is positive unless average income is very low, negatively corre-
lated to the ratio of poverty line over mean income (z/µt) and to the standard deviation
of log-income.
3 Data and Trends
3.1 Data
The data used are mainly from the “Survey on Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW)
of the Bank of Italy. We employ the waves spanning the period between the 1977 and the
2004. The data are yearly until the 1984, after then they became every two years (with a
period of three years between the 1995 and the 1998). The sample has been maintained
as much representative as possible; starting in the 1977 with 2915 households and 9598
individuals interviewed, the sample size has been constantly increased during the time
until the 2004, when 8012 households and 20581 individuals have been interviewed2. The
data are recorded by regions3 and areas (North, Centre and South/Islands), following
the classification (table A.1, appendix) of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Regional GDP, GDP per capita and population share are drawn from the Data-base on
Italian Regions (March 2006 version) of the CRENoS centre (Centre for North South
Economic Research). The final data set used in the parametric analysis results in an
2The sample size has been increased only slightly until the 1984, maintaining it around the 1977 levels;
after then, in the 1986, the Institute strongly scaled up the sample size, with 8022 households and
25068 individuals interviewed.
3The households are grouped across the 20 Italian regions, of which only 19 are taken into account in
the final analysis, since data for the region Val d’Aosta are not available for large parts of the years
of the surveys, and then dropped from the dataset. Given the small size of the region in terms of
geographical size, income measure, and population density, the final analysis is not affected by this
deficiency.
6
unbalanced panel with 342 usable observations, across 19 regions spanning 18 periods of
time.
Even though we acknowledge possible differences and drawbacks when choosing the
relevant welfare measure [22], we employ the annually equivalent4 net disposable in-
come of the households as welfare indicator. In Italy there are two main data sources
for poverty and distributional changes analyses: the Consumption Household Surveys
(“Indagine sui Consumi delle famiglie”) of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)
and the above mentioned surveys of the Bank of Italy. Since the former have been put
under methodological revision in the 1997, the use of those data to carry out a longer pe-
riod analysis is likely to create problems of consistency of the poverty measures between
the periods before and after that year. This has ultimately induced our choice in favour
of the income measure. The notion of income employed is ideally directed to measure the
individual ability and possibility of earnings. Towards this end the definition of income
used is as basic as possible, including job earnings (employed and autonomous jobs) as
well as social and pensions transfers, but excluding financial incomes, as these latter can
be independent from the individual capacities and skills.
The central issue for the identification of poor and non-poor is the definition of the
poverty line, the main distinction being made between absolute and relative. We use a
pseudo-absolute poverty line; once a relative poverty line in a given year is computed (in
our case, the year base is the 1995), the poverty lines for the whole period of analysis are
scaled using the consumer price index, given from the National Institute of Statistics.
The benefit of this procedure is that the features of both the relative and the absolute
poverty lines are taken into account [14]. Following the ISPL (International Standard
of Poverty Line), we define the relative poverty line in the year-base 1995 as the per-
capita mean income of a household of two components; the poor are those who have
an equivalent income below or equal to this standard. This base poverty line is, then,
scaled over time through the CPI (consumer price index), giving the annually poverty
lines for the period 1977-2004 (table A.1, appendix).
3.2 Trends: Poverty, inequality and growth across regions and areas
Italian performance in terms of poverty reduction, inequality and growth does reveal very
contrasting features. Despite the impressive reduction in poverty over the whole period
of analysis, huge differentials do persist across the three main areas of the country (i.e.
North, Centre and South/Island). Southern regions are the poorer and the more unequal
of the country, still showing significantly high poverty and inequality rates (figure A.1,
appendix). Despite their noticeable development of the last decades the central regions
have not yet caught up with the northern ones. The dualistic structure of the country
is therefore apparent as northern regions still present lower poverty and inequality rates
as well as higher rates of growth than the central and southern regions. The estimated
density functions in Figure 1 provide an overview for the whole country and for its sub-
4As the reference unit is the household we employ an equivalence scale to allow the analysis to be
implemented on homogeneous units. Following most of the studies on poverty in Italy, we apply the
“Carbonaro’s equivalence scale”.
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areas for the years 1977, 1991 and 20045. We approximate the income distributions using
a non-parametric kernel density function, using the Gaussian kernel specification6. The
key parameter driving the fit of the kernel function is the bandwidth. Following a large
literature [18, 20, 38, 39, 44] we use the bandwidth h = 0.9 ∗min {sd, 0.75IQR}n−1/5,
where sd is the standard deviation, IQR the interquartile range and n the number of
observations.
Figure 1: Estimated density functions, across time and areas
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Even though the initial tendency towards the bimodality of the national distribution
becomes less apparent by the end of the period of analysis, important differences do
persist across the main areas. The distributions of the southern regions are wider than
the ones of the other regions and of the national ones as well as always behind these,
confirming the higher poverty as well as inequality rates of the South than both of the
country as a whole and of the other parts of it.
These trends are confirmed by specific indices, where we use the headcount and the
Gini as respectively poverty and inequality measures (Table 1). At national level, poverty
in Italy has strikingly declined in the long period. Nonetheless, salient features are given
by the different trends over the two distinct sub-periods. While the headcount declined
from 35.52% to 9.54% over the whole period, the trend clearly shows a reversion at the
beginning of the ‘90s, when poverty incidence does slightly rise; the headcount ratio
increases from 10.43% up to around 15% in the mid ‘90s, with an overall increase by
around 2% by the end of the century. This general trend is followed at sub-area level,
with a rapid decrease in poverty rates between the 1977 and the beginning of ‘90s and
a slight increase in the successive period. Considerable differences do persist, however,
among regions and areas. At the beginning of the period, the number of poor households
in the North was 25.4% of the total, compared to the 32.4% in the Centre and to the
51.2% in the South/Island area; the subsequently sharp decrease in poverty has driven
5We use the 1991 as breaking year since at the beginning of the ’90s Italy did face on with a strong
economic crisis.
6We have tested the Epanechnikov kernel as well, but the results do not change from the ones reported.
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the headcount ratio - in the 1991 - to the 4.9% level in the northern regions, to the 5.8%
level in the Centre and to the yet striking level of 21.4% in the southern regions. In
the last years the headcount shows a slower rate of change, passing from 4.2% to 3.5%
in the North, from 5.2% to 3% in the Centre and from 27.4% to 22.6% in the South,
so that the initially enormous differentials between areas and regions do not disappear.
While the gap between North and Centre does vanish by the 2004, the distance between
these latter and the southern part of Italy remains marked. In the North, poverty rates
reduced by around 85 percent over the whole period, with a huge reduction in the first
part of the sample, when the reduction has proceeded at a rate around the 80%; in the
second part of the sample - between the 1991 and the 2004 - poverty shows a much
slower trend. The higher rate at which poverty fell - by around 48% - in the last decades
in the centre part of the country has allowed the Centre to catch up the northern regions
by the end of the period. In the South, instead, not only did the rate at which poverty
decrease during the first part of the period fall much slower than the other two areas -
by around 58%, but poverty rates also slightly increase between the 1991 and the 2004.
What about the driving forces behind poverty trends, namely, inequality and growth?
At national level, inequality clearly follows the poverty patterns showing a decreasing
trend until the beginning of the ‘90s, with the Gini coefficient shifting from the 34.5%
in 1977 to about 29%, and a remarkable increase in the last decade, shifting it up
to the 34.4% in the 2004. After the huge decrease in the first years of the sample,
inequality increased in all of the three areas along with the recession at the beginning
of the 90’s. Not only is the level of inequality strikingly higher in the South throughout
all the period, but also its dynamic is characterized by different patterns; during the
‘90s the Gini shows a quite stable trend in the South, while it evolved with much more
volatility in the Centre. Low levels of inequality and more stability have characterized
the distribution of incomes in the northern regions; only in the last years, between the
2000 and the 2004, it is possible to discover a spectacular increase in inequality, while
during the ‘90s the income distribution has displayed only a slightly increasing trend.
Finally, two main indicators have been used to measure income growth; namely, the
mean income from the surveys and the GDP per capita. The debate on which sources of
data are more reliable, surveys or national accounts, is far from reaching a conclusion.
A large prejudice against surveys and in favour of national accounts did seem to exist.
However, with improvements in data collection and sampling procedures this prejudice
is likely to be without basis [21]; even the risk of constant under-reporting of the surveys
is not relevant, if the errors from the estimates are random. In our sample, the bias
between national accounts - for measures of changes in GDP - and surveys does not
affect the overall trends at both national and regional level (figure A.2, appendix); the
gap between surveys and national accounts is not relevant and it narrows over time. The
differentials in poverty and inequality are, as expected, coupled by the change in both
mean income and GDP per capita, at national as well as at regional level. In the first
part of the considered period both mean income from the surveys and real (per-capita)
GDP show a rate of change much higher than those in the subsequent period. At national
level the change in mean income from two consecutive surveys has been substantially
high until mid ‘80s, at around 4,5%, then stable at about 3% until the beginning of the
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‘90s, with a final decrease in the last decade, where it changed by around 2% by the
end of the century, and by only around 1,5% between 2000 and 2004. This pattern is
broadly respected by the trend in the GDP per capita (Table 1).
4 Methodology
4.1 Growth Incidence Curve
Preliminarily, the impact of growth on poverty can be graphically examined through the
growth incidence curve (GIC), which illustrates the distribution of growth. The GIC
plots the growth rate of income (or consumption) for each percentile of the distribution
and allows looking beyond averages at what happens to the poor, the middle class and
the non-poor, during the growth process. It allows to evaluate whether growth is pro-
poor, according to both its relative and absolute definitions. Following Ravallion and
Chen [17], the mean growth rate for the poor7 is used as measure of the rate of pro-poor
growth. Growth is called absolutely pro-poor if the mean growth rate for the poor is
greater than zero (“weak” approach) or relatively pro-poor if the mean growth rate for
the poor is at least as large as the growth rate in the overall mean. While the former
only requires the poor to be better off on average in absolute terms, the idea of “relative
pro-poor growth” requires the distributional shifts to be pro-poor as well, namely that
growth process should not widen the initial income differentials.
Formally, at each time t the growth incidence curve maps out the mean growth rate
for the “poor”, used as measure of pro-poor growth and defined by:
gt(p) =
L
′
t(p)
L
′
t−1(p)
(δ + 1)− 1 (11)
where L′(p) is the slope of the Lorenz curve at the pth-quantile, at time t and t − 1,
and δ = (µt/µt−1)− 1 is the growth rate in mean income at time t. It is clear from (11)
that if the Lorenz curve does not change, if - in other words - there are no distributional
effects of the growth process, the rate of pro-poor growth corresponds to the growth rate
in overall mean, in which case all incomes grow at the same rate (gt(p) = δt, for each
quantile p). gt(p) > δt if and only if yt(p)/µt is increasing over time, where yt(p) is the
income of the pth-quantile; further, if g(p) is decreasing (increasing) for all p, inequality
falls (rises) over time. The “absolute” rate of pro-poor growth can be, finally, computed
as the area under the growth incidence curve up to the headcount index.
GIC curves have been constructed from the SHIW surveys for three intervals (i.e. 1977-
2004, 1977-1991 and 1991-2004) to evaluate how growth have affected poverty rates in
periods when they show different patterns and trends. The interpretation of the curve
is based on the definition earlier furnished. If the GIC is above zero it indicates weak
absolute pro-poor growth. If the GIC is negatively sloped it indicates relative pro-
7This measure is different from the growth rate in the mean income of the poor, usually used in the
poverty literature. For instance, the growth rate in the mean of the poor does not match with poverty
measure satisfying the basic axioms, such as monotonicity or transfer axiom.
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poor growth, meaning that the poor benefit more than the non-poor from growth, and
inequality between the two groups fall.
4.2 The Size Income Distribution and Lognormality
Despite the controversy on the goodness of the lognormal distribution to fit well the
whole income distribution, it is largely employed in distributional analysis due to its
good tractability and its property of fitting quite well the lower tails. Singh and Maddala
[45] find out that “...if one considers the entire range of income, perhaps the fit may be
better for the lognormal but the fit towards the upper end is far from satisfactory”.
In order to apply the parametric reference framework in (3)-(10), we test whether
the chosen parametrization fits well the data. Lopez and Serve´n [36] offer a test of
lognormality of the income distribution that exploits the one-to-one mapping between
the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve, existing under the assumption of lognormality.
Under this hypothesis, it follows from (5) that
σ =
√
2 ∗ Φ−1
(
1 +G
2
)
(12)
and it has been shown [3] that
L(p) = Φ
(
Φ−1(p)− σ) (13)
where L(p) is the Lorenz curve with p percentiles.
The test compares the empirical quintiles, obtained by the observed distribution, with
the theoretical ones; the theoretical quintiles, Q20j , may be expressed as
Q20j = L(.2j)− L(.2(j − 1)) (14)
where j = 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes the income quintile. Using (13) and (14), the theoretical
quintiles are computed as
Q20j = Φ
(
Φ−1 (.2j)−
√
2Φ−1
(
1 +Git
2
))
− Φ
(
Φ−1 (.2(j − 1))−
√
2Φ−1
(
1 +Git
2
))
(15)
where i = 1, ..., 20 is the index of the Italian regions and t = 1977, ..., 2004 is the year of
each income surveys from which the quintiles have been computed.
The test is based upon regressing the empirical quintiles shares, Eit20j , on the theoretical
ones, Q20j
Eit20j = α+ βQ
it
20j + v
it
j (16)
where the disturbance has a two-part error component, such as vitj = µi + ε
it
j , with µi
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being an unobservable region-specific effect and εitj being the residual disturbance; both
are assumed i.i.d. with zero mean and variance, respectively, σ2µ and σ
2
ε . Under the
assumption of lognormality, the test is based on the joint null hypothesis that
α = 0;β = 1 (17)
We have performed this test by computing the empirical and theoretical quintiles
shares from each survey, for each year and for each region, obtaining 1356 usable obser-
vations. Based on the results of the test (table 2), we should draw the conclusion that
the lognormal does not fit the empirical distribution of income, as the null hypothesis
in (17) is rejected for the main levels of confidence.
Table 2: Lognormality test
Pooled
OLS
Fixed Effects Random
Effects
β
(s.e.)
.9319***
.0062
.9307***
.0061
.9319***
.0062
α
(s.e.)
.0109***
.0008
.0111***
.0008
.0109***
.0008
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95
# obs. 1356 1356 1356
Test of joint
hypothesis
Ho : α = 0;β = 1
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: *** Significant at 1% level of confidence.
Nonetheless, this test cannot be conclusive on this issue as the authors also point
out. The above test does reject the hypothesis that incomes follow a two-parameters
(i.e. mean and variance) lognormal distribution. Rejecting hypothesis (17) does not
strictly imply the rejection of lognormality more generally, as the empirical distribution
may be described by a three-parameter lognormal density. This could occur if a shift
parameter makes incomes following a lognormal distribution only over the range above
some unknown minimum level τ .
In presence of a shift parameter, while the Gini coefficient does not change the Lorenz
curve does, and (13) may be re-written as
L (p) = pτ + (1− τ) Φ (Φ−1(p)− σ) (18)
As sustained by Lopez and Serve´n, estimation of (16) without taking into account this
factor does produce a positive intercept and a slope less than one. More specifically, the
bigger the shift τ , the larger the constant, and the smaller the slope8. We maintain that
this is in fact the case, by looking at the coefficients of (16) in table 2 and figure 2 below.
8A weakness of this statement may be that we cannot be more precise on the exact order of magnitude
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Figure 2: Lognormality fit
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The coefficients in table 2 do respect the expected pattern. Firstly, these are almost
identical across the three methods of estimation. Secondly and more importantly, the
intercept (α) is slightly positive and the slope (β) is slightly less than one. The sat-
isfactory magnitude of the R-squared would imply the slope and the intercept should
be very close to their expected values under the null of a slope slightly less than one
and an intercept slightly higher than zero. Careful inspection of figure 2 reveals that
the estimated points cluster along the 45-degree line, implying that the lognormal dis-
tribution fits quite well the empirical distribution. Finally, looking at the upper tails of
the distribution, it is possible to see that there are a number of observations clustering
around the upper quintile under observation; this would respect what previously stated
about the properties of the lognormal distribution of fitting the lower tails better than
the upper tails of the empirical distribution.
4.3 Econometric specification
Poverty, mean income and inequality are all aspects of one income distribution; this
implies that the relationship among them depends on the characteristics of the initial
distribution and this must be taken into account in analyzing how and the extent by
which poverty responds to changes in mean income and in inequality. The economet-
ric framework used in this study reflects some shortcomings. Firstly, “the econometric
methodology one might follow has to fit the characteristics of the data and the model
uncertainty arising from of a lack of theoretical guidance in choosing the set of regres-
sors” [25]. There exists no evidence in developed or industrialized countries for growth
and inequality elasticities of poverty, as this assessment has found application almost
exclusively in the developing world.
of this effect. Nevertheless, it is yet possible to maintain the goodness of this approach as what
matters is the direction of this effect. We thank prof. Marselli for having highlighted this point.
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In order to proceed in the construction of a suitable and reliable model, we follow two
steps. Firstly, the estimation of a basic model is performed without initially considering
the role of the level of development and initial inequality. An improved model is further
tested to assess whether and the extent by which the elasticities are affected by these last
factors. The possibility that area heterogeneity exists is finally tested to evaluate whether
structural differences between North, Centre and South do affect poverty responses across
regions and over time. The availability of panel data allows us to control for unobserved
time-constant regional-specific characteristics that may affect both poverty and income.
One of the simplest specifications used to estimate the basic relationship [1, 10, 16] is
given by:
Model “A”
logPit = αi + η logµit + γ logGit + dtDt + εit (19)
where Pit represents the poverty measure (i.e. the headcount) for the region i at time t,
µit the mean income derived from the survey, Git the inequality measure (i.e. the Gini
coefficient in our work, even though some of the quoted works use different measures,
such as the standard deviation of the mean incomes in logs), αi the regional fixed-effects,
Dt time dummies, and εit are the (idiosyncratic) errors.
The estimated coefficients give the (partial) elasticity of poverty with respect to income
(η) and inequality (γ). When income distribution changes during the process of economic
growth, the pure growth effect - derived without considering inequality changes - does
not take into account the role that distributional movements have on poverty rates, both
directly and indirectly through the growth channel; to take into account these effects, the
distributional-neutral income elasticity of poverty is derived by the above specification
(Model “A”).
Following the ideas developed in previous studies [12, 25, 32], we analyze the role of the
level of development by using the ratio of poverty line over mean income and the initial
level of inequality as proxies for the “crowdedness” near the poverty line; both measures
are intended to capture whether and the extent by which the level of development and
the initial characteristics of the income distribution affect both the income and the
inequality elasticity of poverty. We depart from the analyses developed in those studies;
while they prefer to model these effects in terms of growth and inequality changes on
poverty changes, we implement a level model so that our final specification to test is
given by:
Model “B”
logPit = αi + [η1 + η2 (z/µit) + η3Git] logµit+
+ [γ1 + γ2 (z/µit) + γ3Git] logGit + dtDt + εit (20)
where the terms in squared brackets on the right hand side are intended to capture the
interaction between income, inequality, and the factors above discussed. The density
near the poverty line is captured by the term (z/µit) (POVRATIO); its interaction
with both mean income and inequality (log) is intended to measure the impact that
the “crowdedness” near the poverty line has on the degree of reaction of the poverty
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measure with respect to both income and inequality changes. The initial inequality
impact is proxied by the interaction between the initial level of the Gini index (Git) with
the income and inequality measures.
The estimator used is the efficient GMM (Generalized Methods of Moment) that
allows to have consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters as well as to deal
with the necessity of capturing the fixed effect terms the panel data structure allows to
analyze.
The main issue behind the estimation of such a model is the possible correlation be-
tween the explanatory variables - mainly mean income - and the errors. The presence of
endogeneity would undermine the consistency of the OLS estimates or it would be cause
of asymptotic least squares bias. This can arise for several reasons, the most impor-
tant ones in our case being the measurement errors in income and the “joint” causation
of poverty and income. Income and poverty measures are derived from the same sur-
veys data and the error term is therefore possibly correlated with measurement errors
of income. This shortcoming might be, for instance, due to lower participation rates
in the surveys among richer groups than among poorer groups; were this phenomenon
confirmed the consequence would be to overstate poverty and understate income [22].
Measurement error might likely be only of minor concern for the relatively good reliability
of the surveys we use and since as survey methods improve this bias would decrease over
time. Unobserved time-varying characteristics that affect income may affect poverty as
well. In fixed effects regressions the estimates are robust to any correlation between the
explanatory variables and the time-invariant error component. However, the bias would
remain due to any correlation between the explanatory variables and time-varying omit-
ted variables. The panel structure can avoid this problem by introducing time-dummies9.
At the same time, this inclusion might be the source of endogeneity in models like the
one we present. The reference is to the “joint” causation, or simultaneity bias, of poverty
and income [24]. Generalizing the Timmer’s conclusions [47], it has been shown [24] that
the introduction of time dummies in a level model does avoid to cancel out this source
of bias if both the variables are subject to same shocks, even when the errors are serially
independent. If income is trended and the errors serially independent, the estimation
of a level model produces consistent OLS estimates and is superior to a model in differ-
ences, by avoiding or canceling out the joint causation effect; however, when introducing
time-dummies, the global trend present in the data is canceled out and the consistency
of the least squares estimations cannot be maintained. If our variable contained a trend,
this would have been eliminated by adding time-dummies, suggesting the need for cau-
tion on this issue. This turns out to be the key argument in our choice of estimating
models “A” and “B” in levels and it is strictly connected to the results obtained in the
previous sub-section on the size income distribution and the lognormality fit. As shown
there, incomes follow a lognormal distribution only conditioned on the presence of a shift
parameter. While the estimation of the theoretical linkages in (3)-(10) is allowed since
the lognormal specification does fit well our data, at the same time it requires to be
strongly cautious on the use of a first-difference model as the distribution is lognormal
9Testing for their individual and joint significance in all the models analyzed, they results all significant.
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only due to the presence of that shift parameter. This two interacting elements drive
ultimately our preference for level models to exploit those theoretical relations.
Given our specification, the likely correlation between mean income and errors cannot
be discharged and, how endogeneity tests also show, such a problem if not controlled for
would have given inconsistent estimates. Although finding proper instruments is not an
easy task, following the literature [41], we use the log per capita GDP (logGDPpcit) and
lagged values of the log mean income (logµit−1) as instruments for the mean income (log).
These instruments do accomplish the two specification conditions required; they are both
relevant and orthogonal to the error structure. The latter condition is tested through the
overidentifying restrictions test, or Hansen-J test, which is the key test to assess both the
validity of the model and the exogeneity of the instruments. The second requirement
is that the instruments are relevant, that is correlated with the endogenous regressor
and with good explicatory power; apart from being correlated with the regressor the
consequence of instruments with little explanatory power (weak instruments) is increased
bias in the estimated coefficients, reducing the efficiency of the estimator. This peril is
evaluated looking at the outcome of the first stage of the regression; as Baum et al.
[9] suggest, low partial R-squared and, when there is one endogenous regressor, F-test
of the joint significance of the instruments below 10 are good indicators for both low
correlation of the instruments with the endogenous regressors and their weak explanatory
power. The main hypothesis made throughout is that endogeneity is actually present in
the model; several formal tests exist to evaluate this possibility. We prefer the general
C-test10 to the classical Hausman test, as in some case this latter statistics can return
negative values that cannot allow making any judgment.
The motivation for using the GMM estimator derives, ultimately, from the considera-
tion that “if heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the
simple IV estimator...” [9]; in presence of heteroskedasticity, the IV estimator, although
consistent, is not efficient [9, 37]. While the GMM is more efficient than the IV under
heteroskedasticity of unknown form [9], two tests have been used. The first one is a
modified White test for panel data, which tests for constant error variance across groups
in the OLS case; by assuming constant variance within each cross-section units, this test
infers for the presence of different variances between the panels. The second test, the
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg, specific for the IV model uses the fitted values
of the dependent variable and its square.
Diagnostic tests have been implemented; the general result is that the model exhibits
no serial correlation, but heteroskedasticity. Serial correlation has been tested taking
into account the unbalanced, or better the unequally spaced nature, of our panel data
set. At this aim, we used two tests: the Wooldridge test ([48], p. 274) and the locally
best invariant (LBI) test for zero first-order serial correlation. The latter one, provided
by Baltagi and Wu to deal with unequally spaced panels [6, 7], tests for the hypothesis
of AR(1) process present in the data.
10The C-statistics is also known as “difference-in-Sargan or “distance difference”.
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5 Results
5.1 Pro-poor growth and the Growth Incidence Curve
The results (Figure 3) confirm that growth had different effects in the different analyzed
periods and across the main areas of the country. In the long run (1977-2004) growth
has been weakly pro-poor as the GIC is always above zero, so that even the poorest
have benefited from growth episodes. It is not possible to definitely claim that growth
has been pro-poor in relative terms as well, since the growth incidence curve is not
monotonically decreasing; it shows a reversion around the 55th percentile, but not a
decreasing trend in the the lowest part of the distribution.
Figure 3: Growth incidence curves, national analysis
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An important caveat refers to the biases produced by the surveys; it is generally
accepted that these are strongest at the extreme bounds of the distribution. We have
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dealt with these issues by trimming the distributions at the 1st and 99th percentile, and
by generating confidence intervals using the bootstrap technique with 100 replications.
Although the poor have generally benefited proportionally more than the non-poor,
the distribution of gains from growth seems to have been biased in favour of the upper-
middle class, rather than the poorest parts of the distribution. As growth rates have
been almost constant between the 20th and the 50th percentile the poor and the middle
class have benefited in equal extents from growth episodes; growth has not been pro-
poor in relative terms since it has not been positively biased towards the poorest part of
the distribution. The decreasing trend in the final part of the distribution clearly shows
that growth has favoured the upper-middle class with respect to the richest part of the
population. Overall, growth has positively favoured poverty reduction with two distinct
distributional effects. The gap between the lowest part of the population and the middle
class does increase over time, whereas the distance between the upper-middle class and
the richest part does narrow.
This general picture is characterized by different trends in the two analyzed sub-
periods. In the first part of the sample, between the 1977 and the 1991, growth drove
the very strong rate of poverty reduction as both the growth incidence curve was mono-
tonically decreasing and most of the mean growth rates for the poor were higher than
the growth rate in mean. This trend suggests that growth was pro-poor in absolute as
well as in relative terms over this period, implying a reduction of inequality between the
lowest and the highest part of the distribution as well. In contrast, between the 1991
and the 2004, growth was strongly against the poor; the annual growth rate for the poor
was lower than the growth rate in mean for almost all of the percentiles and the upward
slope of the curve suggests that the distribution of gains from the growth process has
been unequal, favouring the upper classes of income.
The analysis is largely confirmed also at regional level (figure 4). All of the three
main areas do follow the national pattern over the two reference sub-periods, with scale
differences between regions; regions of the central area show, on average, higher rates
of pro-poor growth than northern and southern regions. The overall effect - between
1977 and 2004 - of growth on cumulative poverty illustrates that while in the northern
and central regions growth has largely favoured the poor, in the South it has been more
biased in favour of the richest part of the distribution.
Coupling this analysis with the summary statistics and the trends offered in the previ-
ous section, it may be alleged that these results depend only in part on the differentials
of growth rates between the three areas and among the regions within these areas; an
important part for explaining why growth had these different effects on the poor in the
several parts of the country should be attached also to the different trends in the dis-
tribution of incomes. In this regard, the well-known Italian dualism is confirmed not
only in terms of macro and aggregate aspects (i.e. growth) but also with regard at the
individual distribution of incomes.
Briefly, while the big reduction in poverty achieved in the first years of the sample has
been driven by pattern of growth not biased against the poor, the renewed increase in
poverty of the last decade may be explained not only by slight rates of changes in mean
income, but also, or at least in part, by pattern of growth biased against the poor part of
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Figure 4: Growth incidence curves, across regions and periods
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the distribution and in favour of the richest one. Although the pattern of Italian growth
has positively affected poverty rates, it has entailed striking effects on inequality as well;
to better quantify the role of inequality on poverty rates and the overall importance
of these two distinct forces for poverty reduction, a more carefully empirical analysis is
developed in the next sections, where a specific look at the single elasticities of poverty
with respect to income and inequality is provided.
5.2 Income and Inequality Elasticities of Poverty: econometric results
We estimate income and inequality elasticities of poverty with the efficient GMM estima-
tor, endowed with more time periods data than usually available in similar applications
for developing countries. The results (table 3 and 4) predict that even if poverty strongly
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reacts to growth, it is also unmistakably influenced by inequality.
We firstly estimate the gross and distributionally-neutral income elasticities. Both
the models are consistent with choice of the efficient GMM estimator. The key test,
the overidentifying restrictions or Hansen-J test, passes in both the models. The main
assumption behind the consistency of the parameter estimates is that the instruments
are orthogonal to the errors terms; this statistic tests the joint hypothesis of the correct
model specification and the orthogonality conditions and its low significance (high p-
values) implies that actually the instruments are not correlated with the errors. Two
tests confirm that the errors are independent, or more specifically do not follow an
AR(1) process. Even if in the fixed effect structure the correlation in the composite
errors (αi + εit) is generally dominated by the presence of the non-observed individual
heterogeneity (αi), the Wooldridge statistic tests for the presence of serial correlation
in the idiosyncratic part of the error structure, because “sometimes, {εit} can have
very strong serial dependence, in which case the usual FE standard errors...can be very
misleading. This possibility tend to be a bigger problem with large T” ([48], p. 274).
This is the first test we perform and the high p-values imply that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. Along with this and in order to
take into account the unbalanced structure of the data set, the no correlation has been
confirmed with the Baltagi/Wu locally best invariant (LBI) statistic11.
Measurement errors and joint causation of poverty and income can cause inconsistency
of the OLS estimates. The high values of the endogeneity test statistics (low p-values),
which call for rejecting the exogeneity of the tested regressor, do require a more careful
account of the OLS inconsistency. We deal with this issue by instrumenting mean income
with its lagged value and with GDP per capita, and all the interaction terms related to
the mean income with corresponding instruments. The relevance of these instruments is
confirmed from the first stage fixed effect OLS regression (LSDV), where the endogenous
variables are regressed on the full set of instruments. When the partial R-squared are
not much relevant, the value of the F-test of excluded instruments above 10 suggests
that the risk that weak instruments might affect the efficiency of the estimates can be
removed [9]. This latter criterion is reliable only in the case one endogenous regressor is
present in the model; as a matter of fact, in the first two specifications (table 3, columns
1 and 2) only one regressor (i.e. mean income) is considered endogenous. When, in the
other models (i.e. table 3 - columns 3 and 4, and table 4), more regressors are tested
as endogenous both the partial R-squared and the F-tests confirm the goodness of those
instruments (see table A.2 and A.3 in appendix). Finally, the gain in efficiency of the
GMM with respect to the IV estimator is confirmed from the heteroskedastic nature of
these models; both the tests reject indeed the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
The coefficients are highly significant and with the expected signs; poverty rates are
correlated negatively to income changes and positively to inequality. Are both remark-
able the size of the coefficients and the high stability of the income elasticity to the
inclusion of the inequality term; a 1% increase in survey mean income reduces poverty
11Although exact critical values are not available for this statistic, values of the statistics above 1.5 or
far below 2 are generally accepted as reliable indicators of no first-order correlation.
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measure by 2.5%, while a 1% increase in inequality will increase it by 1.6%. Controlling
for inequality, income elasticity does not substantially change.
Table 3: Income and inequality elasticities (GMM estimation) - model “A”
Dependent Variable: log(headcount)
Variable (s.d.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(mean income) -2.533***
(0.570)
-2.508***
(0.349)
- -
log(Gini) - 1.644***
(0.189)
- 1.527***
(0.175)
log mean income*Area Dummy
North - - -2.142***
(0.604)
-2.148***
(0.376)
Centre - - -2.174***
(0.633)
-2.107***
(0.391)
South-Island - - -1.865***
(0.677)
-1.887***
(0.412)
Time-Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N-observation 323 323 323 323
R2 0.738 0.834 0.761 0.843
Hansen-J
(p-value)
0.509
(0.475)
1.884
(0.169)
0.749
(0.386)
0.965
(0.325)
F-test for equality of income
elasticities across areas
(p-value)
- - 45.12
(0.000)
13.625
(0.000)
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation
Wooldridge
(p-value)
0.002
(0.966)
1.086
(0.311)
0.057
(0.813)
3.065
(0.097)
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.645 1.835 1.761 1.835
Heteroskedasticity
OLS
(p-value)
178.24
(0.000)
425.43
(0.000)
315.95
(0.000)
458.90
(0.000)
IV
(p-value)
72.003
(0.000)
144.771
(0.000)
74.101
(0.000)
154.070
(0.000)
Endogeneity
(p-value)
17.383
(0.000)
22.857
(0.000)
18.481
(0.000)
24.207
(0.000)
Note: The reported is the within R2 from fixed effect estimation; for the Baltagi/Wu statistic, values
above 1.5 (or far below 2) are accepted as indicator of no AR(1) process; time-dummies significant.
Significance levels: ***1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
The gross, or “empirical” [16], income elasticity is substantially equal to the distributionally-
neutral one. The gross income elasticity, computed in (1), picks up changes in inequality
coinciding with growth; controlling for these changes in (2), the coefficient returns the
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distributionally-neutral income elasticity, giving a proper estimation of η of section 2.
The goodness of fit improves in the second specification ((2)); the within R-squared
substantially improves when inequality is controlled for, increasing the variation in the
data explained by the included regressors by around 10 percentage points. The size of
the coefficients suggests that both income and inequality affect poverty rates substan-
tially, even if the effect of the former appears greater than the latter. Poverty rates do
respond relatively more elastically to income than to inequality changes, even if also the
latter effect is striking. We explore the possibility that inter-area differences exist in
the elasticities of poverty, by including a complete set of area dummies in (3) and (4).
The F-test on the equality of these elasticities across the areas confirms that the three
parameters are different, and there exists substantial variation across North, Centre and
South. The goodness of the econometric specification is - as above - confirmed. The
first stage regressions for the relevance of the instruments confirm the relevance and the
power of the chosen instruments (table A.2, appendix). Both the F-test of the excluded
instruments and the high partial-R2, ranging between 0.95 and 0.97, are good indicators
of relevant and powerful instruments. The gross (3) and the distributionally-neutral
income elasticity (4) are again similar. The interesting feature is the difference between
the three areas, characterized for different income elasticities of poverty. Poverty in the
North and in the Centre is more reactive to growth than in the South, where the gains
from growth are lower than in the other two areas; while a 1% increase in survey mean
income produces in the North and Centre a reduction in headcount by 2.14%, in the
South the decrease is by 1.8 percent. In all the areas, finally, poverty is again very
responsive to inequality, where a 1% increase in inequality implies an increase in poverty
by 1.5%.
5.2.1 Level of Development and Initial Inequality
The different degrees of sensitivity of poverty across North, Centre and South suggest
the need to analyze whether the level of development and the initial inequality may be
the source of the different elasticities (table 4, columns (1) and (2)). All the diagnostic
tests pass, along with the hypotheses we have done about the structure of the model.
The Hansen-J statistics confirm both the suitability of the models and the orthogonality
conditions. The power of the instruments is highly notable. All the instruments are
strongly relevant; in all the first stage regressions the partial R-squared range between
0.84 and 0.99 and, along with the relevant values of the F-tests, it does exclude the peril
of inefficient estimates due to weak instruments. The high within R-squared of these
two models suggests that about 84% of the variance is explained by the data. All the
coefficients but one are highly significant. The most important evidence suggested by
these two final specifications is the size of the coefficients; given the introduction of the
interaction terms, the coefficients of the log(income) and log(Gini) do not longer reflect
the income and inequality elasticities. These latter must now take into account the effect
of the two added terms, which, as hypothesized, do affect their magnitude. They are
strongly sensitive to the position of the poverty line in the income distribution and to
the level of growth rates. The low levels of Italian growth rates over the whole period
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may, at least in part, explains the high magnitude of the coefficients, as lower growth
rates would clearly imply much higher elasticities.
Table 4: The role of initial conditions (GMM estimation) - model “B”
Dependent variable: log(headcount)
Variable (s.d.) (1) (2)
log(mean income) -10.098***
(1.019)
-13.110***
(2.136)
log(Gini) 1.863***
(0.207)
3.118***
(1.185)
log(mean income)*POVRATIO -1.687***
(0.239)
-2.949***
(0.682)
log(mean income)*Gini .0430
(0.045)
.548**
(0.213)
log(Gini)*Gini - 3.596**
(1.543)
log(Gini)*POVRATIO - -4.141***
(1.590)
Time-Dummies Yes Yes
N-observation 323 323
R2 0.845 0.841
Hansen-J
(p-value)
3.780
(0.286)
2.851
(0.415)
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation
Wooldridge
(p-value)
0.310
(0.584)
0.420
(0.525)
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.837 1.891
Heteroskedasticity
OLS
(p-value)
372.65
(0.000)
402.91
(0.000)
IV
(p-value)
261.129
(0.000)
402.222
(0.000)
Endogeneity
(p-value)
10.775
(0.013)
16.053
(0.001)
Note: The reported is the within R2 from fixed effect estimation; for the Baltagi/Wu statistic, value
above 1.5 (or far below 2) are accepted as indicator of no AR(1) process; time-dummies significant.
Significance levels: ***1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Estimating the impact of these factors on the income elasticity of poverty only (1), the
interaction term between the initial level of inequality and log(mean income) results not
significant. This implies that the income elasticity of poverty is not affected by the initial
level of inequality, while it is affected by the density near the poverty line. However,
when the most complete version is implemented (2), all the coefficients are significant,
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including the effect of the initial inequality on the income elasticity. The coefficients
of income and inequality (log) are no longer directly interpretable as “net” elasticities;
the presence of the interaction terms implies that these elasticities must now reflect also
the influence of the initial level of inequality and the crowdedness near the poverty line.
The negative sign on the coefficient log(income)*POVRATIO (-2.94) implies that the
higher, in absolute terms, the ratio of the poverty line over mean income, the greater
the sensitivity of the poverty measure to income changes; in other words, the higher
the density around the poverty line, the higher the income elasticity of poverty. The
relationship between these two terms may be driven by a couple of factors, such as the
high impact that growth has on the upper-middle class along with the fact that we
use a poverty line partly relative; what matters is not only the movement of the mean
income with respect to the poverty line, but also the extent of the proportional changes
between the mean income and the poverty line. Initial level of inequality does affect
this elasticity as well; the positive coefficient (0.54) implies that the higher the initial
level of inequality, the lower is the income elasticity. The difference in the magnitude
of the two interaction terms suggests that this latter factor is less relevant than the
ratio of poverty line over mean income in shaping the degree of sensitiveness of poverty
to income. The same factors strongly determine the impact of inequality changes on
poverty. Both its interaction terms are significant and relevant in size. The positive sign
(3.59) of the former, capturing the effect of the initial level of inequality, implies that
the higher the initial level of inequality the stronger the inequality elasticity of poverty.
This means that the higher the level of initial inequality, the greater the effect of the
change of the income distribution on the poverty measure. We take this as an indicator
that in southern regions, where higher is the initial Gini, changes in the distribution that
would reduce inequality may produce stronger poverty reductions. Finally, the ratio of
poverty line over mean income also strikingly affects the extent by which poverty rates
respond to changes in distribution; the negative sign on the interaction between them
(-4.19) confirms that higher is the density near the poverty line, lower is the inequality
elasticity of poverty.
In all the specifications, poverty is shown to be very responsive to growth as well as
to inequality in the reverse direction. The notion of pro-poor growth refers to poverty-
reducing policies as the ones that maximize the impact of growth on poverty reduction.
Yet no definitive consensus exists on the effect of inequality; this has been sustained
to have positive, negative or no role in determining poverty reduction both directly
and indirectly through the growth channel. The magnitude of the inequality elasticity,
instead, confirms the determinant role of policies aimed at reducing inequality to achieve
the maximum benefits in terms of poverty reduction. Different factors can influence these
links; the level of development is strongly relevant for determining the extent by which
poverty respond to survey mean income and distributional changes. The difference in
the estimated elasticities across the three main areas may be well explained by these
last factors. Areas with different level of development and initial inequality do present
different rates of responsiveness to survey mean income changes, with the southern part
of the country reacting less elastically than the northern and the central.
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6 Conclusion
This paper deals with the evaluation of poverty sensitivity to growth and distributional
changes in Italy, across its regions and over a three-decade period, between the 1977 and
the 2004. Poverty is still of high concern in Italy due to the huge differentials between
northern, central and southern regions, to the strong differences between the poorest,
middle and richest parts of the income distribution, and because of the recent trends of
the 90’s, figuring out an increase in poverty and inequality indices.
The growth incidence curves used to plot the distribution of benefits across the per-
centiles of the population highlights interesting features of the Italian growth process.
In the long-run, between 1977 and 2004, growth has been pro-poor in the weak abso-
lute connotation, positively favouring poverty reduction, as the GICs are always above
zero. Nonetheless, the distribution of gains from growth seems to have been biased
in favour of the upper-middle class, suggesting that growth has not been pro-poor in
relative terms. While the gap between the lowest part of the population and the mid-
dle class has increased over time, the distance between the upper-middle class and the
richest part narrows. In the two analyzed sub-periods, the behaviour of poverty reac-
tions to growth is very dissimilar. Between the 1977 and the 1991, growth has driven
the strongest rate of poverty reduction, given that both the growth incidence curve is
monotonically decreasing and most of the mean growth rates for the poor have been
higher than the growth rate in mean. The striking recession at the beginning of the 90’s
has reversed these trends not only causing lower growth rate in GDP and surveys mean
income, but also distorting the distribution of gains of the growth process. During this
period not only the annual growth rate for the poor is lower than the growth rate in
mean for almost all of the percentiles, but also the upward slope of the curve suggests
that the distribution of gains has been unequal, favouring the upper classes of income;
the renewed increase in poverty may be explained not only by slight rates of changes
in mean income, but also, or at least in part, by pattern of growth biased against the
poor part of the distribution and in favour of the richest one. The comparison between
North, Centre and South highlights the different degrees of poverty sensitivity to growth
in those areas; while in the northern and central regions growth has largely favoured the
poorest part of the distribution, in the South growth has been more biased in favour of
the richest and the upper-middle parts of the distribution.
Income and inequality elasticities of poverty have been estimated to analyze the rate at
which poverty responds to growth episodes and distributional changes. Overall, poverty
across Italian regions is highly sensitive to both growth and distributional changes.
The distributional-neutral income elasticity coefficient at about -2.5 suggests that a 1%
increase in surveys mean income reduces the poverty index by about 2.5 percent. The
inequality elasticity coefficient of 1.6 implies an high sensitivity of poverty to inequality
changes as well, where a 1% reduction in inequality turns out in a reduction of poverty
by about 1.6 percent. The differentials between areas can be due to their different
degrees of sensitivity; the northern and central regions respond more elastically to change
in surveys mean income (respectively -2.14 and -2.17) than the southern part of the
country (-1.8). Across the country the inequality elasticity is remarkably high, with a
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coefficient of about 1.5. While poverty sensitivity to inequality is quite stable even when
areas differentials are taken into account, the disparity in the rate at which the three
different areas respond to change in income is consistent with the picture of poverty
across them; the benefits from growth are higher in northern and central part of the
country than in the southern. The level of development and initial level of inequality
are good candidates to explain those differentials. Higher initial levels of inequality
are associated with greater inequality elasticity and lower income elasticity of poverty,
reccomending that had stronger redistribution policies been undertaken southern regions
would have benefited more than the northern and central parts of country. Finally, the
higher, in absolute terms, the ratio of the poverty line over mean income, used as proxy
for the density around the poverty line, the greater the sensitivity of the poverty measure
to income changes. On the inequality side, the negative sign on the interaction term
(-4.19) implies that higher is the density near the poverty line, lower is the inequality
elasticity of poverty.
It is possible to claim that growth-oriented policies have surely favoured the strong
reduction in poverty across Italian regions. However, the fact that the extremely relevant
role of inequality within and between the regions in shaping those poverty trends has
not been taken fully into account could be seen as one of the major concerns of the
differentials between and within the three areas as well as for the still considerable
retard of large parts of the country.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Classification, CPI, Poverty line
Region name Area
Piemonte North
Lombardia North
Trentino - Alto Adige North
Veneto North
Friuli - Venezia Giulia North
Liguria North
Emilia Romagna North
Toscana Centre
Umbria Centre
Marche Centre
Lazio Centre
Abruzzi South/Island
Molise South/Island
Campania South/Island
Puglia South/Island
Basilicata South/Island
Calabria South/Island
Sicilia South/Island
Sardegna South/Island
Year CPI Poverty line
1977 19.99 1665.735
1978 22.42 1874.999
1979 25.74 2151.226
1980 31.19 2611.605
1981 36.74 3071.985
1982 42.79 3582.587
1983 49.06 4109.93
1984 54.36 4545.198
1986 62.86 5265.063
1987 65.83 5507.809
1989 73.48 6143.969
1991 83.24 6964.281
1993 91.38 7642.294
1995 100 8370.753
1998 108.1 9048.543
2000 112.7 9433.587
2002 118.8 9944.189
2004 124.5 10505.02
Source: Classification and CPI (year base 1995) are from National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Note: Yearly poverty line from author’s calculation on SHIW, in euros (€).
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Figure A.1: Head-count and Gini, by regions
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Figure A.2: Survey vs National Account
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Table A.2: First Stage (Summary) Results for model “A” (Reference to Table 3)
Model (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’)
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)
F-test of excluded
instruments
14.12
(0.0000)
17.31
(0.0000)
- -
Partial-R2 0.1448 0.1514 - -
Instruments log(mean income) t−1; log(GDPpc)
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)*North
F-test of excluded
instruments
- - 1236.34
(0.0000)
1804.17
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 - - 0.9685 0.9735
Instruments log(mean income) t−1; log(GDPpc)*North
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)*Centre
F-test of excluded
instruments
- - 585.27
(0.0000)
618.48
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 - - 0.9727 0.9726
Instruments log(mean income) t−1; log(GDPpc)*Centre
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)*South/Island
F-test of excluded
instruments
- - 843.10
(0.0000)
843.90
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 - - 0.9503 0.9501
Instruments log(mean income) t−1; log(GDPpc)*South/Island
Table A.3: First Stage (Summary) Results for model “B” (Reference to Table 4)
Model (1’) (2’)
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)
F-test of excluded
instruments
676.32
(0.0000)
155.06
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 0.9662 0.8439
Instruments log(mean income) t−1; log(GDPpc)
Endogenous variable: log(mean income*POVRATIO)
F-test of excluded
instruments
29165.82
(0.0000)
2390.25
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 0.9988 0.9873
Instruments Log(mean income)t−1*POVRATIO; log(GDPpc)*POVRATIO
Endogenous variable: log(mean income)*Ginit−1
F-test of excluded
instruments
11737.81
(0.0000)
2493.20
(0.0000)
Partial-R2 0.9991 0.9868
Instruments log(GDPpc)*(Gini)t−1; log(mean income)t−1*(Gini)t−1
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